El papel moderador de los congresos locales sobre el ciclo político presupuestal oportunista en los estados mexicanos/ The Moderating Role of Local Congresses on the Opportunistic Political Budget Cycle in Mexico

Juan Argáez

Resumen


Resumen. Los estudios sobre el ciclo político presupuestal oportunista en los estados mexicanos comparten la limitación de que la política presupuestal es percibida como una decisión unilateral del Ejecutivo y omiten considerar las restricciones políticas e institucionales que éstos enfrentan. El propósito de este trabajo es relajar este supuesto y confirmar la teoría de que el aumento del nivel de competencia en las elecciones para diputados locales juega un papel moderador en el ciclo político oportunista. La evidencia empírica presentada ratifica que los congresos locales ejercen un papel moderador e inhiben el ciclo político oportunista cuando existe un alto grado de competencia en las elecciones para diputados locales

Abstract. The literature on the opportunistic political budget cycle in Mexican States shares the limitation that budgetary policy is assumed to be a unilateral decision of the executive branch and fails to consider the political and institutional constraints governors face. The purpose of this study is to relax that assumption and evaluate whether an increase in the level of competition in elections for local congresses plays a moderating role on the opportunistic political budget cycle. The empirical evidence presented shows that local congresses exert a moderating role and inhibit the opportunistic political budget cycle when there is a high level of competition in elections for state representatives


Palabras clave


ciclo político presupuestal; ciclos oportunistas; congresos locales; competencia electoral; competencia política; estados mexicanos; political budget cycle; opportunistic budget cycle; state congresses; electoral competition; competition policy; Mexican s

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.29265/gypp.v25i2.198

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