Desigualdad, corrupción y Lord Acton

Autores/as

  • Stephen D. Morris Coordinación de Humanidades y coordinador del Laboratorio de Documentación y Análisis de la Corrupción y Transparencia en el Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales en la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29265/gypp.v30i3.959

Palabras clave:

corrupción, corrupción institucional, corrupción legal, desigualdad, Lord Acton

Resumen

Muchas investigaciones destacan una correlación entre la desigualdad y la corrupción. Por lo general, estos estudios se concentran en la desigualdad económica y solo una dimensión de la corrupción. Inspirado en la frase célebre de Lord Acton que asocia el poder y la corrupción, el presente trabajo pretende explorar el impacto de diferentes niveles o desigualdades de poder sobre distintas dimensiones, perspectivas y formas de corrupción. De estilo teórico y conceptual, ofrece un modelo que liga la corrupción estructural, institucional, legal y convencional a categorías de tipo ideales de poder y distribuciones de poder. Los niveles de poder van desde el poder absoluto, asociado con el poder abrumador de construir el concepto de la corrupción, hasta el poder de distorsionar la implementación o administración de la política pública ligado a la corrupción administrativa o convencional. El trabajo destaca también la influencia o hegemonía de la perspectiva ortodoxa sobre la corrupción y habla de la necesidad de una mejor distribución de poder entre instituciones, organizaciones y personas para atender a la corrupción en todas sus formas.

Biografía del autor/a

Stephen D. Morris, Coordinación de Humanidades y coordinador del Laboratorio de Documentación y Análisis de la Corrupción y Transparencia en el Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales en la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)

Stephen D. Morris tiene un doctorado en Ciencias Políticas por la Universidad de Arizona. Ha sido profesor en la Universidad de las Américas-Puebla, University of South Alabama, Thunderbird University y becario Fulbright en la Universidad de Guadalajara. Actualmente es investigador de la Coordinación de Humanidades y Coordinador del Laboratorio de Documentación y Análisis de la Corrupción y Transparencia en el Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México y profesor-investigador (con licencia) de ciencias políticas en Middle Tennessee State University. Es autor de varios libros y trabajos sobre la corrupción en México, América Latina y Estados Unidos, la política mexicana y la identidad nacional y perspectivas sobre Estados Unidos en México.

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2021-10-25
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Cómo citar

Morris, Stephen D. 2021. «Desigualdad, corrupción Y Lord Acton». Gestión Y Política Pública 30 (3):9-36. https://doi.org/10.29265/gypp.v30i3.959.

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