Influencia de las elecciones en la gestión de los gobiernos locales. Análisis empírico en la región española de Valencia

Isabel Brusca, Margarita Labrador, Vicente Montesinos

Resumen


Este trabajo analiza la influencia de las elecciones en la gestión pública local, desde la perspectiva de los ciclos políticos presupuestarios. El objetivo es analizar si los políticos utilizan las políticas de gasto con el objetivo de influir en las decisiones de voto de los electores y, en ese caso, qué políticas de gastos son las preferidas para tratar de aplicar esa influencia. También analizamos el efecto que esta utilización de las políticas de gasto con objetivos electorales puede tener en la posición financiera de los entes locales y, en concreto, en su deuda. Los resultados muestran la existencia de ciclos políticos presupuestarios en los municipios de la región de Valencia, si bien no son tan importantes como a priori cabía esperar.


Palabras clave


administración pública; gobierno local y municipal; políticas públicas

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.29265/gypp.v24i2.110

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